Abstract. IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys introduced by Lai and Massey in 1991. IDEA is one of the most widely used block ciphers, due to its inclusion in several cryptographic packages, such as PGP. Since its introduction in 1991, IDEA has withstood extensive cryptanalytic effort, but no attack was found on the full (8.5-round) variant of the cipher. In this paper we present the first known attack on 6-round IDEA faster than exhaustive key search. The attack exploits the weak key-schedule algorithm of IDEA, and combines Square-like techniques with linear cryptanalysis to increase the number of rounds that can be attacked. The attack is the best known attack on IDEA. We also improve previous attacks on 5-round IDEA and introduce a 5-round attack which uses only 16 known plaintexts.
Introduction
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is a 64-bit, 8.5-round block cipher with 128-bit keys proposed by Lai and Massey in 1991 [19] . Due to its inclusion in several cryptographic packages, such as PGP , IDEA is one of the most widely used block ciphers. Since its introduction, IDEA resisted intensive cryptanalytic efforts [1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13-17, 21-23] . The best published chosen-plaintext attack on IDEA is an attack on 5-round IDEA that requires 2 19 chosen plaintexts, and has time complexity of 2 103 encryptions [3] . The best published related-key attack is an attack on 7.5-round IDEA that requires 2 43.5 known plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2 115.1 encryptions [3] . Along with the attacks on reduced-round variants, several weak-key classes for the entire IDEA were found. The largest weak key class (identified by a boomerang technique) contains 2 64 keys, and the membership test requires 2 16 adaptive chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and has a time complexity of 2 16 encryptions [6] .
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In this paper we present the first known attacks against 5.5-round and 6-round IDEA. These higher-order differential-linear [4] attacks consist of three components:
1. Constructing linear equations involving the least significant bits of the intermediate values of the cipher. We note that this idea was proposed and used in [3, 17, 23] . 2. Using a higher-order differential (or a Square property) to simplify the linear equations. We note that this modification was proposed in [17] . However, as we show later, the Square distinguisher used in [17] is incorrect, and hence, we replace it by another distinguisher. 3. Taking advantage of the weak key schedule of IDEA -we observe that in some cases, guessing only 103 of the 128 key bits of IDEA is sufficient for encrypting two full rounds of the cipher, and even more than that.
The 5.5-round attack requires 2 32 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of about 2 127 encryptions, about twice faster than exhaustive key search. The 6-round attack requires almost the entire code book and has a time complexity similar to that of the 5.5-round attack. We note that the time complexity of the attacks could be improved significantly if the Square distinguisher could be replaced by a better one, like the one presented in [17] . However, we were not able to find such a distinguisher at this stage.
We then show two improvements to the 5-round attack presented in [3] . The first improvement reduces the data complexity of the attack by a factor of √ 2 to 2 18.5 known plaintexts, without affecting the time complexity of the attack of 2 103 encryptions. The second improvement reduces the data complexity to 16 known plaintexts, while raising the data complexity to 2 114 encryptions. The complexities of the new attacks, along with selected previously known attacks, are summarized in Table 1 .
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briefly describe the structure of IDEA. In Section 3 we present the new attack on 5.5-round IDEA. In Section 4 we extend the 5.5-round attack to an attack on 6-round IDEA. We present improved attacks on 5-round IDEA in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper. We start with an observation due to Biryukov (according to [23] ) and Demirci [14] . Let us examine the second and the third words in all the intermediate stages of the encryption. There is a relation between the values of these words and the outputs of the M A layer in the intermediate rounds that uses only XOR and modular addition, but not multiplication. Let P = (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) be a plaintext
(2) When we consider the value of the least significant bit (LSB) of the words, modular addition is equivalent to XOR and we can simplify the above equations into:
and
Taking this into consideration and XORing the above two equations we obtain
(5) This equation is called in [17] "the Biryukov-Demirci relation".
In order to simplify this equation, we consider the XOR of the intermediate values of several encrypted plaintexts. In [3] the XOR difference between two plaintexts is used; in our attack we use the XOR value of larger sets of plaintexts.
Consider a structure of plaintexts P 1 , . . . , P m , where m is an even integer. Then the XOR of the equations of the form (5) given by
where (6) is the basic equation used in our attack, where m and the exact structure of plaintexts are specified later.
The Second Component -A Square-Like Structure
In order to further simplify Equation (6) we want to use special structures of plaintexts, for which we will get S 1 = S 2 = 0, independently of the key. Our structures are higher-order differentials, a special case of Square-like structures that were used in [7, 12, 18, 20] . The structures we use and their properties are described in the following proposition. j=1 s 2 (P j ) = 0, and this completes the proof.
In the sequel of the paper we call structures which satisfy the above conditions, "right structures".
It follows from the proposition that if we take a right structure as
We note that [17] makes use of a seemingly better Square-like structure that is described in the following statement [17 
If this statement was correct, it could be used to improve significantly the time complexity of our attack. However, it appears that the statement is incorrect. For the structure described in the statement we indeed have S 1 = 0, but we do not have S 2 = 0, since nothing can be said about the values s 2 (P j ). The following set of constants is a counterexample for Statement 1:
We note that Z 2 2 is not relevant to the approximation, but it is required for defining the key for which the above statement fails. Using the key schedule, we derive the following subkeys as well: Z 
The Third Component -Exploiting The Weak Key Schedule
The fact that the key schedule of IDEA is relatively weak has been known for a long time, and was already used to devise related-key attacks on reduced-round IDEA (e.g., [5] ) and to find large weak key classes for the entire cipher (e.g., [6] ). However, other key recovery attacks (e.g., [2] ) usually exploited other properties of IDEA and took only a small advantage of the key schedule.
In our attack, we use the weakness of the key schedule in order to calculate all the remaining S i values, while guessing a relatively small number of key bits. Consider a 5.5-round variant of IDEA starting with the third round. We observe that in order to compute the values S 5 , S 6 , S 7 from the ciphertexts, it is sufficient to know only 103 key bits. The values S 5 , S 6 , S 7 are determined by the values of the ciphertext and of the subkeys Z 4 . All the required 15 subkeys use only 103 bits of the master key, whereas bits 100-124 of the master key remain unused.
Since in our case (for 5.5 rounds), Equation (7) is reduced to
we can guess 103 key bits and check whether the equation holds.
The Basic 5.5-Round Attack
In this subsection we combine the components presented in the previous subsections to devise an attack on 5.5-round IDEA. As was shown in Section 3.3, once we have a right structure, it is possible to check the guess of 103 key bits. This is done by partially decrypting the entire set under the subkey guess, and checking whether Equation (8) holds. The problem in finding a right structure is the key addition layer, which prevents constructing the right structures immediately. The solution to this problem is to use more plaintexts, which increases the data complexity, but in exchange, the set is ensured to contain (several) right structures. We use a set of 2 32 plaintexts, such that the second and the fourth words are fixed to some arbitrary constant, and the first and the third words obtain all possible values. In such a structure, for any given subkeys, it is possible to find 2 16 
D).
For each possible value of key bits 0-104 and 121-127 (note that from these bits we already guessed key bits 89-104 and 121-8) partially decrypt the ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts of the right structure to get the values S 5 , S 6 , S 7 . Check whether Equation (8) holds. If not, discard the partial key guess. If the equation holds, pass the key guess for further analysis. 4. Filtering the remaining key guesses: For the remaining key guesses, take another right structure of plaintexts, i.e., pick a different value for F , and repeat Steps 2-3, with three different selections. If a partial key guess passed all the four tests, perform exhaustive key search on the remaining key bits.
Analysis and Improvement of the Basic Attack
The attack requires one structure of 2 32 plaintexts, and thus the data complexity of the attack is 2 32 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of
Step (1) is 2 32 encryptions. The time complexity of
Step (2) is 2 48 partial decryptions. We note that this step can be performed as a precomputation, but there is no need to do it since the time complexity of this step is negligible with respect to the total time complexity of the attack.
The most time consuming part of the attack is Step (3) which is repeated 2 32 times (for each guess of bits 89-104 and 121-8). In this step, the attacker guesses 80 key bits and performs a partial decryption of 2 16 ciphertexts. The partial decryption includes two full rounds and three out of the eight operations of an additional round. Hence, the time complexity of this stage is about 0.43·2 128 encryptions in total. About half of the keys are expected to pass to Step (4). For these keys, the attacker performs three additional filterings in
Step (4), with time complexity of (0.22 + 0.11 + 0.05) · 2 128 . The 2 124 remaining keys are checked by exhaustive key search. Hence, the total time complexity of the attack is (0.43 + 0.22 + 0.11 + 0.05 + 0.06) · 2 128 = 0.87 · 2 128 encryptions, which is only slightly better than exhaustive key search.
In order to reduce the time complexity of the attack, we introduce a small change in Step (2). We observe, that there is no need to fix a concrete value of F such that p 3 = F for all the values of the structure; it is sufficient to have for all the plaintexts in the considered structure a fixed value for p 3 . We exploit this observation by eliminating the need to guess bit 121 of the key in Step (2). We do not guess the value of this bit, but rather assume that its value is zero. As a result, when we decrypt the values j ⊕ F through the addition with Z 3 3 , all the bits except for the MSB are correct, but the MSB might be wrong. However, if our assumption was incorrect and the values of the MSBs are wrong, this happens to all the elements of the structure simultaneously, since
Hence, if we take the plaintext structure (A
as in the basic attack, we have two possibilities: If our assumption was correct, we get a right structure as in the basic attack. If our assumption was incorrect, then for all the elements of the structure we have p 3 = F ⊕ 8000 x . However, p 3 still assumes the same value for all the elements of the structure, and hence, the structure is a right structure.
Therefore, we can obtain right structures without guessing the value of bit 121 of the key (by making sure to choose the F values without using two values which differ only in the MSB). This improvement reduces the time complexity of all the steps of the attack (except for the final exhaustive key search) by a factor of two. Hence, the time complexity of the improved attack is (0.22+0.11+0.05+ 0.03 + 0.06) · 2 128 = 0.45 · 2 128 = 2 126.85 , about twice faster than exhaustive key search.
It is also possible to use up to 2 15 right structures from a given plaintext structure, and use them to filter wrong subkey guesses. When using k right structures with the improved attack, the data complexity is 2 32 chosen plaintexts, and the time complexity is
encryptions. When using 16 right structures, the time complexity is 2 126.8 encryptions. The memory requirements of the attack are mostly for storing the data, i.e., 2 32 blocks of 128-bit each (or 2 36 bytes).
The 6-Round Attack
In this section we extend the 5.5-round attack to an attack on 6-round IDEA. The variant we attack starts before the M A layer of round 2 and ends before the M A layer of round 8. We observe that the key bits used in the M A layer of round 2 (bits 57-88) are included in the bits that are guessed in the 5.5-round attack. Hence, we can add this half round in the beginning of the attack without enlarging the time complexity.
However, in this case it is much harder to construct right structures, and the data complexity is significantly increased. Our best method is to ask for the encryption of almost the entire code book, and look for the right structures after a partial encryption. We note that if a way to construct right structures is found, then the data complexity of the attack can be reduced. However, we did not find appropriate structures at this stage.
Assume that we start with 2 64 −a known plaintexts, where a is a constant we determine later. For a fixed value of the subkeys Z plaintexts, and forms a right structure. Hence, a has to be small enough, such that for almost every value of the subkeys, there will be at least four "full" classes in the pool of known plaintexts. In order to estimate the number of full classes, we look at the plaintexts that are not known to the attacker. Assuming that these plaintexts are uniformly distributed over the 2 48 classes, the probability that none of them falls in some prescribed class is (
48 . Hence, the expected number of classes that are not ruined by missing plaintexts, i.e., the full classes, is 2 48 e −a/2 48 . If we take a = 2 53 , this expected number is close to four. However, we want that for most of the possible values of the subkeys there will be four right structures. Hence, we take a = 2 52 . In this case, the expected number of right structures is about 2 25 , and for most of the possible values of the subkeys, there will be enough right structures. If for some subkey guess, there are not enough right structures, the attacker has to check this guess separately by exhaustive key search over the remaining key bits. 1 We note that this improvement can also reduce the data complexity of the 5. the resulting plaintexts are in the data set.
Our first improvement reduces the data complexity of the attack. We note that ∆s 4 = 0 is satisfied whenever ∆p 4 = 0 holds. In addition, we observe that the subkey Z 4 1 is covered by the 103 key bits guessed during the attack. We also note that a difference in the MSB is preserved by addition with an unknown subkey. Using these three observations, we can enlarge the number of plaintext pairs that can be used in the attack. Instead of using only pairs for which ∆(X = 8000 x , since for such pairs we also have ∆s 4 = 0. As a result, we can start with 2 18.5 known plaintexts, and out of the 2 36 possible pairs we can still find 32 pairs satisfying ∆s 4 = 0. The rest of the attack is similar to the attack algorithm of [3] .
A 5-Round Attack Using only 16 Known Plaintexts
Our second improvement has much in common with the first improvement. We note that guessing the subkey Z 4 3 adds only eleven bits to the total number of guessed key bits. On the other hand, after guessing this subkey, we are able to compute the exact value of p 4 for all the plaintexts. Moreover, since the subkey Z 4 5 is also covered by the guessed key bits, we are able also to compute the exact values of s 4 for all the plaintexts, and hence to compute the value of ∆s 4 for any pair of plaintexts. As a result, all the plaintext pairs, and not only a part of them, can be used to filter subkey candidates. Since each plaintext pair filters about half of the subkey candidates, 16 pairs are sufficient to reduce the number of possible keys to 2 113 , and these candidates can be checked by exhaustive key search.
We note that the 16 known plaintexts compose 16·15/2 = 120 pairs. However, only 15 of these pairs can be linearly independent, and hence only 15 pairs can be used for filtering key candidates. Using a smart ordering of the operations, it can be shown that the time complexity of this attack is 2 114 encryptions.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we presented the first known attacks on 5.5-round and 6-round variants of IDEA. Our attack on 6-round IDEA has a time complexity of 2 126.8
encryptions and data complexity of 2 64 − 2 52 known plaintexts. The attacks exploit three techniques: Constructing a linear equation involving the LSBs of several intermediate encryption values, using Square-like structures, and exploiting the weak key schedule. Each of these techniques was already used to attack reduced variants of IDEA, but the novel combination of the techniques allows to improve the previously known attacks significantly.
We also showed that it possible to attack 5-round IDEA using only 16 known plaintexts with time complexity of 2 114 encryptions. The 5-round attack exploits the weakness of the key schedule of IDEA, that allows to recover many subkeys while guessing only a subset of the key bits.
